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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I will present three arguments (based on the notions of constitution, 
metaphysical reality, and truth, respectively) with the aim of shedding some new 
light on the structure of Fine’s (2005, 2006) ‘McTaggartian’ arguments against the 
reality of tense. Along the way, I will also (i) draw a novel map of the main realist 
positions about tense, (ii) unearth a previously unnoticed but potentially 
interesting form of external relativism (which I will label ‘hyper-presentism’) and 
(iii) sketch a novel interpretation of Fine’s fragmentalism (which I contrast with 
Lipman’s 2015, 2016b, forthcoming). 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
According to Kit Fine’s (2005, 2006) ‘McTaggartian’ argument against 
the reality of tense, the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by 
tensed facts 
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REALISM:  Reality is constituted (at least, in part) by tensed facts. 
(Fine, 2005: 271)1 
 
 is incompatible with the following three theses: 
 
NEUTRALITY: No time is privileged, the tensed facts that constitute 
reality are not oriented towards one time as opposed to 
another. 
ABSOLUTISM: The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. 
not relative to a time or other form of temporal standpoint. 
COHERENCE: Reality is not contradictory, it is not constituted by 
facts with incompatible content. (Fine, 2005: 271)2   
 
It appears fair to say that both Fine’s arguments and his novel map of 
‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ forms of tense-realism represent one of the 
most interesting contributions to the philosophy of time in recent years. 
However, despite all the attention and interest it has attracted in the 
literature, Fine’s discussion of tense-realism has often been met as posing 
a certain interpretative challenge, which has sometimes even lead to 
question its very intelligibility.3 As a result, there seems to be no clear 
                                                     
1 Notice that Fine (2005) explicitly takes talk about facts to be completely 
reducible to an ‘official idiom’ featuring the operator ‘in reality it is the case that’. 
I will address this issue in section 5. 
2 In this paper I will only focus on the more detailed presentation of the arguments 
given in Fine (2005). 
3 Consider, just as a way of example, the following passages taken from the recent 
literature: ‘It would seem, then, that non-standard realism does not constitute a 
genuine alternative. It is the conceptual gesture that results from trying to do full 
justice to our intuitive picture of passage. That picture is composed of 
incompatible elements which together deprive it of literal content’ (Deng, 2012: 
28-9); ‘[…] if we cling to the standard understanding of incompatibility, then 
fragmentalism risks being outright unintelligible (Lipman 2015: 3125); ‘But does 
[Fine’s] argument succeed? One difficulty in answering this question is that it is 
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consensus in the literature, as of today, on how exactly Fine’s arguments 
and ‘non-standard’ realist positions are to be interpreted. For this reason, 
the aim of this paper is to present and articulate three structurally similar 
arguments (based on the notions of constitution, metaphysical reality, and 
truth, respectively), which seem to capture in a clear and simple way at 
least the spirit (if not the letter) of Fine’s original arguments.  
The ‘argument from constitution’ follows the lines of Fine’s original 
argument targeting the realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. 
The ‘argument from reality’ takes its steps from Fine’s ‘reductionist’ idea 
that talk about facts can always be dispensed for by using a reality operator 
‘in reality, it is the case that’. Finally, the ‘argument from truth’ stems 
directly from an interpretation of Fine’s fragmentalism (which I will 
contrast with Lipman’s 2015, 2016b, forthcoming) that is in turn animated 
by the idea that Fine’s reality operator should be taken to be factive.  
Along the way, I will also show how is it possible to re-draw Fine’s 
map of possible tense-realist positions in an intuitive and seemingly natural 
way. This will allow me to unearth a potentially interesting version of 
relativist tense-realism (which I will label  ‘hyper-presentism’) that appears 
to have gone unnoticed in the literature so far. In addition, I will argue 
that the three arguments presented appear to be deeply inter-connected 
not only by some intuitive ideas concerning the ‘derivative’ character of 
conjunctions and mereological fusions, but also by some seemingly 
plausible principles (at least in this context) concerning truth and 
truthmaking. 
Although reasons of space will force me to leave many important issues 
and questions for another occasion, my hope is that despite its mainly 
expository character, this work may nevertheless begin to shed some new 
and interesting light both on ‘Fine’s McTaggart’ and on the general 
question of how to adequately chart the fascinating, if perilous, landscape 
of tense-realism.   
 
 
                                                     
far from obvious how the four principles are to be understood’ (Correia and 
Rosenkranz, 2012: 309).  
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II. Absolutism, Neutrality and Coherence 
 
An important clue on how to properly interpret Neutrality, 
Absolutism, and Coherence can be found in section 4 of Fine (2005), 
which is dedicated to the ‘sophisticated’ version of Fine’s McTaggart.4 
There, Fine begins to (re-)present his argument by stating that, when it 
comes to the idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts, tense-realists 
face a choice, as they can take their notion of constitution to be either 
 
(F1) tensed or tenseless,  
(F2) relative or absolute,  
(F3) coherent or incoherent.5 
 
In this paper I will assume, for simplicity’s sake, that realists are in 
possession of a basic notion of constitution. Given this assumption, three 
important points immediately follow from the choices represented by 
(F1)-(F3). First, since (F2) and (F3) are clearly ways to express the idea 
that realists must decide whether to accept Absolutism and Coherence, 
(F1) allows us to interpret Neutrality as the idea that the basic notion of 
                                                     
4 In his ‘sophisticated McTaggart’ (2005: section 4) Fine considers the possibility 
that realists may use some non-basic notion of constitution (for this reason he 
uses in his second argument the word ‘composition’ instead of ‘constitution’ to 
signal that said notion may not be basic). He also considers the possibility that the 
realist, faced with the McTaggartian objection, may reject the idea that there is a 
basic notion of constitution and embark thus on an infinite regress, which he clearly 
considers to be vicious. For simplicity’s sake in this paper I take tense-realism as 
equipped with a basic notion of constitution and leave a discussion of the alleged 
viciousness of such an infinite regress for another occasion. Among others, see 
Bliss (2013, 2014), Morganti (2009) and Tahko (2014) for recent criticism of the 
idea that infinite regresses and circularities in explanation are always vicious. 
5 ‘The argument from these new assumptions can now be stated. Suppose the 
realist asserts his position using some notion of composition. It can be tensed or 
tenseless, relative or absolute, coherent or incoherent. However, we know from 
the original argument that it cannot conform to all four assumptions’ (Fine 2005: 
274; see also footnote 4).  
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constitution is tenseless. Second, it follows from merely combinatorial 
considerations that there are actually eight tense-realist positions resulting 
from (F1)-(F3) (see Figure 1 below). Finally, Fine’s argument can be 
presented as an argument that is directed against the tense-realist position 
holding that the basic notion of constitution is both tenseless (by 
Neutrality), absolute (by Absolutism), and coherent (by Coherence) (I will call 
this position ‘Naïve Realism’). 
How are then Absolutism, Neutrality, and Coherence to be properly 
formulated in light of (F1)-(F3)?  Let’s begin with (F2) first. As it seems 
fairly intuitive and natural, I will simply assume that to be an absolutist 
about the basic notion of constitution is to take it to be expressed by a 
monadic predicate, whereas to be a relativist is to take it to be expressed by 
a relational predicate instead: 
 
ABSOLUTE CONSTITUTION: 𝐶(𝑓) (‘f constitutes reality absolutely’) 
RELATIVE CONSTITUTION: 𝐶𝑡(𝑓) (‘f constitutes reality relative to  
time t’)6 
 
As for (F1), I propose to take the question about whether the relevant 
notion of constitution is tensed or tenseless as the question about whether 
sentences of the form ‘f constitutes reality (absolutely or relative to a time 
t)’ are sensitive to tense-theoretical embeddings. Consider, in fact, a run-
of-the-mill eternalist who takes it to be a tenseless truth that, say, Caesar 
crosses the Rubicon in 49 BC. One might think that such an eternalist is 
committed to claiming that it doesn’t make sense to say things like ‘It was 
the case two days ago that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC’ or ‘It will be 
                                                     
6 This is also the route initially taken by Correia and Rosenkranz (2011: 43). 
However, they then proceed to define Absolutism as the position according to 
which ‘The basic notion of constitution is absolute (eternalism), or it is relative but 
there is no factual variation (sempiternalism)’ (2011: 56). According to the present 
approach, this is a mistake. The issue about whether facts constitute reality at 
every time (in a sense of constitution that may or may not be basic) is (at least in 
principle) orthogonal to the issue about whether the basic notion of constitution is 
absolute or relative. In this sense, Correia and Rosenkranz’s ‘sempiternalism’ 
qualifies here as a kind of relativism. 
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the case two weeks from now that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC’. 
However, she appears to be perfectly in position to accept such claims, 
insofar as she also claims that tenseless sentences like ‘Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon in 49 BC’, if true, are always true and, if false, always false. What is 
important for eternalists is in fact the idea that tenseless sentences cannot 
change their truth value and thus cannot be sometimes true and sometimes 
false. This, however, is perfectly compatible which with their being 
embeddable by temporal operators.  
Let then ‘𝑨’ and ‘S’ stand for the operators ‘it is always the case that’ 
and ‘it is sometimes the case that’.7 The question about whether the notion 
of constitution is tenseless or tensed may thus be recast as the question 
about whether the following rule of ‘alwaysation’ is valid: 
 
ALWAYSATION:  𝑺𝑝 ⊢ 𝑨𝑝  (from ‘It is sometimes the case that p, 
infer ‘It is always the case that p’) 
 
Notice that, since the always-operator is most plausibly taken to be 
factive  
 
ALWAYS-FACTIVITY:   𝑨𝑝 ⊢ 𝑝 
 
Alwaysation entails that also the sometimes-operator is factive: 
 
SOMETIMES-FACTIVITY:  𝑺𝑝 ⊢ 𝑝 
 
Therefore, since also the operator ‘it is now (or presently) the case that’ 
(‘𝑵’) is also factive 
 
NOW-FACTIVITY:   𝑵𝑝 ⊢ 𝑝, 
                                                     
7 ‘𝑨’ and ‘𝑺’ may be defined by means of the familiar temporal operators ‘It will 
be the case that p’ (‘𝑭’) and ‘it was the case that p’ (‘𝑷’) as follows: 
 𝑨𝑝 =𝑑𝑓 𝑝 ∧ ~𝑷~𝑝 ∧ ~𝑭~𝑝 
  𝑺𝑝 =𝑑𝑓 𝑝 ∨ 𝑷𝑝 ∨ 𝑭𝑝 
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it follows that, if Alwaysation is rejected, only facts presently/now 
constituting reality are guaranteed (by Now-Factivity) to constitute reality, 
whereas there is no guarantee that reality is also constituted by facts that 
used to constitute reality or that will constitute reality.8 In this sense, if 
Alwaysation is rejected, the present seems indeed to be the privileged time 
reality is ‘oriented towards’ (Fine 2005: 271; 273), consistently with what 
Fine says about his ‘presentism’ (for simplicity’s sake, in what follows we 
can take Neutrality to just be the thesis that the sometimes-operator is 
factive). 
Finally, (F3). Fine presents fragmentalism as the idea that reality is not 
‘of a piece’   
 
Under [fragmentalism], we give up the idea that reality is of a piece. 
Reality will divide into fragments, no two of which can be regarded 
as belonging to a single coherent whole. (Fine 2005: 262) 
 
Under such a view, reality will be fragmentary. Certain of the facts 
constituting reality will ‘cohere’ and some will not. Any fact is 
plausibly taken to belong to a ‘fragment’ or maximally coherent 
collection of facts; and so reality will divide up into a number of 
different but possibly overlapping fragments. (Fine 2005: 281) 
 
This suggests that the notion of coherence that is central to the 
definition of fragmentalism may be expressed by means of the following 
principles (interpreting ‘<’, for the time being, as ‘belonging’): 
  
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE*: 𝐶(𝑎), 𝐶(𝑏)  ⊢ ∃𝑥(𝐶(𝑥) ∧ 𝑎 < 𝑥 ∧ 𝑏 < 𝑥)  
RELATIVIST COHERENCE*:  𝐶𝑡(𝑎), 𝐶𝑡(𝑏)  ⊢ ∃𝑥(𝐶𝑡(𝑥) ∧ 𝑎 < 𝑥 ∧ 𝑏 < 𝑥)   
 
These principles say that, if any two facts 𝑎 and 𝑏 constitute reality 
(absolutely/relative to a time t), then there is a fact x such that (i) x 
constitutes reality (absolutely/relative to a time t) and (ii) both 𝑎 and 𝑏 
belong to 𝑥. The notion of ‘belonging’ used in this definition is admittedly 
                                                     
8 In this passage I am assuming Absolutism for simplicity’s sake. 
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obscure and it would certainly be a theoretical advantage if it could be 
reduced to more familiar notions. For this reason, I propose here to adopt 
the idea that facts are endowed with mereological structure and to interpret 
the relevant notion of ‘belonging’ by means of the notion of parthood.  
If we endorse the definitions of coherence just given and interpret ‘<’ 
as parthood, fragmentalism becomes the claim that for some pair of facts 
there is no fact having both of them as parts (which would entail that there 
is no fact constituting reality that has all the facts constituting reality as 
parts). However, for reasons that will become clear below (section 6.2), I 
prefer here to assume a weaker position and take instead fragmentalism as 
the theory rejecting the idea that, for any two facts 𝑎 and 𝑏, if both 𝑎 and 
𝑏 constitute reality, then also their binary fusion (‘𝑎 + 𝑏’) constitutes reality. 
I take thus the notion of coherence to be best expressed by means of the 
following principles: 
 
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE: 𝐶(𝑎), 𝐶(𝑏)  ⊢ 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑏)  
RELATIVIST COHERENCE: 𝐶𝑡(𝑎), 𝐶𝑡(𝑏)  ⊢ 𝐶𝑡(𝑎 + 𝑏)    
 
 
III. Naïve Realism and temporal variegation  
 
Fine explicitly takes Realism to be incompatible with the conjunction 
of Neutrality, Absolutism and Coherence only insofar as it is accompanied 
(as it seems indeed highly plausible) by the idea that reality is ‘reasonably 
variegated’ over time: 
 
VARIEGATION: any reasonable view of how temporal reality might 
be constituted should allow for its being reasonably variegated over 
time; and presumably it will then be constituted by incompatible 
facts, i.e. by facts with incompatible contents. (Fine, 2005: 272) 
 
A potential difficulty in formulating this notion of ‘variegation’ (as I 
will call it) lies in the very notion of incompatibility. However, for what 
concerns us here it is sufficient to focus on the seemingly plausible 
thought (at least given our mereological understanding of Coherence) that, 
if two facts are incompatible, their fusion can never constitute reality 
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(absolutely/relative to a time t), and so it never does. The assumption that 
reality is ‘sufficiently variegated’ can thus be taken as the thesis that there 
are two facts constituting reality over time such that their fusion never 
constitutes reality, and thus as the claim that (depending on whether the 
basic notion of constitution is taken to be absolute or relative) one of the 
two following schemas has some true instance: 
 
ABSOLUTIST VARIEGATION: 𝑺𝐶(𝑎) ∧ 𝑺𝐶(𝑏) ∧ 𝑨~𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑏)  
RELATIVIST VARIEGATION: 𝑺𝐶𝑡(𝑎) ∧ 𝑺𝐶𝑢(𝑏) ∧ 𝑨~∃𝑣𝐶𝑣(𝑎 + 𝑏) 
 
According to the absolutist principle of variegation, it is sometimes the 
case that a certain fact a constitutes reality and it is sometimes the case that 
a certain fact b constitutes reality, and yet it is never the case that the fusion 
of a and b constitutes reality. Instead, according to the relativist idea of 
variegation, it is sometimes the case that a certain fact a constitutes reality 
at a certain time t and it is sometimes the case that a certain fact b 
constitutes reality at a certain time u and yet it is never the case that, for 
any time v, the fusion of a and b constitutes reality at v.  
Fine’s argument against Naïve Realism—to the effect that Variegation, 
Absolutism, Neutrality and Coherence lead to contradiction—can 
therefore be presented as follows: 
 
The argument from constitution 
 
Naïve realists take both reality to be sufficiently variegated and the 
basic notion of constitution to be absolute. Therefore, they must take 
some instance of Absolutist Variegation to be true. However, the 
following argument shows that Absolutist Variegation, Neutrality and 
Coherence lead to a contradiction:  
 
 
(A1) 𝑺𝐶(𝑓) ∧ 𝑺𝐶(𝑔) ∧ 𝑨~𝐶(𝑓 + 𝑔)    Ass. (Absolutist Variegation) 
(A2) 𝑺𝐶(𝑓)                                           A1 by ∧-E 
(A3) 𝑺𝐶(𝑔)                                           A1 by ∧-E 
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(A4) 𝑨~𝐶(𝑓 + 𝑔)                                 A1 by ∧-E 
(A5) 𝐶(𝑓)                                             A2 by Neutrality  
(A6) 𝐶(𝑔)                                             A3 by Neutrality 
(A7) ~𝐶(𝑓 + 𝑔)                                    A4 by 𝑨-factivity 
(A8)  𝐶(𝑓 + 𝑔)                              A5,A6 by Coherence 
(A9)  Contradiction!                          A7,A8 by ∧-I 
 
 
IV. Seven ways out 
 
We are now in position to better appreciate the map of tense-realism 
resulting from our reconstruction of Fine’s argument. Consider Figure 1. 
The first thing to notice is that four of the eight positions depicted in 
Tense-realism 
Absolutism 
Tensed 
absolutism 
Relativism 
Tensed 
relativism 
Tenseless 
absolutism 
Tenseless 
relativism 
Coherent 
tensed 
absolutism 
Coherent 
tenseless 
relativism 
Incoherent 
tensed 
absolutism 
Coherent 
tenseless 
absolutism 
Incoherent 
tenseless 
absolutism 
Coherent 
tensed 
relativism 
Incoherent 
tensed 
relativism 
Incoherent 
tenseless 
relativism 
FINE’S 
PRESENTIS
M 
Fragmentalist 
Presentism 
 
 
NAÏVE 
REALISM 
 
FINE’S 
FRAGMENTALISM 
 
Hyper- 
Presentism 
 
Fragmentalist 
Hyper-
presentism  
 
FINE’S 
RELATIVIS
M 
Fragmentalist 
Relativism 
 
vv v v v
Figure 1 
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Figure 1 are indeed the four forms of realism that are considered by Fine. 
The third one (counting from left to right) is the naïve realist position, 
which is the target of Fine’s McTaggartian argument, that is a coherent 
and tenseless form of absolutism. The first one is what Fine calls 
‘presentism’ which is a form of coherent absolutism that rejects Neutrality 
and thus takes the basic notion of constitution to be tensed. Fine’s 
‘fragmentalism’ is the fourth option: an incoherent form of tenseless 
absolutism. Finally, the seventh position featured in Figure 1 is Fine’s 
‘relativism’, which endorses Coherence and Neutrality but rejects 
Absolutism. 
One of the reasons of interest concerning the taxonomy presented in 
Figure 1 is that it highlights four possibilities that appear to have gone 
unnoticed in the literature so far. Three are incoherent (and thus 
fragmentalist) alternative to Fine’s fragmentalism. The fourth is a coherent 
and yet tensed form of relativism which I am here labelling ‘hyper-
presentism’.  
As for the three novel forms of fragmentalism, it seems natural to 
assume within this framework a certain presumption against incoherence. 
In this sense, the three alternative forms of fragmentalism appear to be 
uninteresting because unnecessary, as the contradiction threatened by 
Fine’s argument is avoided before having to choose whether to reject 
Coherence or not. 
The case of hyper-presentism appears to be potentially more 
interesting. According to hyper-presentists, not only do facts constitute 
reality only relative to a certain temporal standpoint, but facts about 
temporally-relative constitution can themselves change. For hyper-
presentists it is thus possible that f presently constitutes reality at time t and 
that either it will not be the case or it wasn’t the case that f constitutes reality at 
time t. This idea may remind one of seemingly similar claims made by 
growing-block theorists, who typically admit the existence of facts of the 
form ‘p-at-t’ but, contrary to eternalists, think that also these kind of facts 
can (and indeed do) undergo change.9 Nevertheless, it must be stressed 
                                                     
9 Growing-block theorists typically take times to come into existence ‘as time goes 
by’, so that even if it is currently the case that p-at-t, before time t existed there wasn’t 
any fact of the form p-at-t (for any p). The locus classicus for the growing-block 
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that the kind of relativity to time that is displayed by facts of the form ‘p-
at-t’ in this case isn’t the kind of relativity that characterises Fine’s 
relativism. As a matter of fact, Fine clearly distinguishes between an internal 
and an external form of relativity to times:  
 
It is also crucial to a proper understanding of this position that one 
sharply distinguish between what one might call the ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ forms of relativity. There is a sense for the anti-realist in 
which tense is relative. Tensed facts constitute reality only in so far 
as they assume a relative form; and what properly belongs to reality 
is not the fact that I am sitting but the fact that I am sitting at a 
given time (or some other fact of this sort). For the neutral realist 
[endorsing relativism], by contrast, tense is not relative in this sense, 
but absolute. The tensed facts themselves belong to reality, and do 
not get to belong to reality through being relativized to a time. 
However, their belonging to reality is a relative matter. (Fine 2005: 
279-80) 
  
Growing-block theorists are thus best regarded as presentists in Fine’s 
sense of the term, that is as absolutists taking the notion of constitution to 
be coherent and yet tensed. Instead, hyper-presentists are external relativists 
claiming that even the way in which facts constitute reality relative to a 
time can change. In other words, for hyper-presentists not only is there 
‘no saying how reality is without presupposing a temporal standpoint’ 
(Fine 2005: 80), but also the way reality is from a certain temporal 
standpoint can change over time. 
The issue about whether hyper-presentism can be developed into an 
interesting and fruitful form of realism about tense goes well beyond the 
scope of this paper and must be left for another occasion. Nevertheless, 
the following seems to be a potentially promising suggestion. Hyper-
presentists could be tense-realists that distinguish between two 
fundamental forms of tensed facts and incompatibility between them. On 
the one hand, they could take there to be ‘regular’ tensed facts like 
[Socrates is sitting] and [Socrates is standing]. Some of these facts (like the 
                                                     
theory is Broad (1923). For a recent reformulation of the theory see Correia and 
Rosenkranz (2013). 
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ones just mentioned) are incompatible. However, reality is coherent 
because they never constitute reality at the same time. On the other hand, 
hyper-presentists may also countenance facts like [T1 is present] and [T1 
is past]. Also some of these facts are incompatible (like the ones just 
mentioned). However, hyper-presentists could claim that, contrary to the 
first kind of facts, facts like [T1 is present] and [T1 is past] are eternal, in 
the sense that if, for any time t, a fact of this kind constitutes reality at t, 
then it constitutes reality at every time. Suppose, for instance, that [T1 is 
present] constitutes reality at T1. It follows that it also constitutes reality 
at T2. In this case, hyper-presentists could continue, coherence is 
guaranteed by the fact that [T1 is past] (which is incompatible with [T1 is 
present]) doesn’t constitute reality at any time. However, hyper-presentists 
might also think that the reality of tense requires that both [T1 is present] 
and [T1 is past] somehow get to constitute reality. For this reason, they 
could say that, while it is currently the case that, for every time t, [T1 is 
present] constitutes reality at t, it will nevertheless be the case that, for every 
time t, [T2 is present] constitutes reality at t. In this way, while the change 
concerning the first kind of facts will consist in the fact that different facts 
constitute reality at different times, the change concerning facts about ‘A-
properties’ will consist in the fact that although certain ‘A-facts’ presently 
constitute reality (at every time) it was (or will be) the case that different 
‘A-facts’ constitute reality (at every time).  
 
 
V. Reality 
 
Fine (2005: 267-70) famously distinguishes between the notions of mere 
and metaphysical reality and takes the latter to be expressible by the primitive 
operator ‘in reality, it is the case that’:  
 
…it will be convenient to suppose that we have an ‘official’ idiom 
for making reality claims. My preference […]  is to take there to be 
a primitive sentential operator, call it 𝑅, whose intended reading is, 
‘in reality, it is the case that’. Reality claims may then be formed by 
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affixing this operator to an appropriate sentence S. (Fine 2005: 
268) 10 
 
According to him, it is this official metaphysical idiom which should 
be used when making claims concerning a realist position about tense. He 
acknowledges that, ‘for ease of expression’ it may be useful to talk about 
facts constituting reality. However, this doesn’t mean that a realist should 
be committed to the (fundamental) existence of facts or to the idea of 
reality as a ‘container’ of facts. Talk about facts constituting reality should 
be taken as always dispensable in favour of the official idiom. Therefore, 
if the reconstruction of Fine’s argument that I am proposing in this paper 
is to be successful, it ought to be possible to re-formulate all its relevant 
claims in Fine’s official idiom. This is what I set out to do in this section. 
Fine’s reality operator 𝑅 appears to be suitable only to express an 
absolutist conception of reality, according to which, if p is really the case, 
it is really the case simpliciter that p and not relative to a certain temporal 
standpoint. This suggests that the distinction between an absolute and 
relative notion of reality ought to be captured by means of a distinction 
between two primitive operators: Fine’s absolutist 𝑅 and a relativist 
operator 𝑅𝑡 indexed to a time: 
 
ABSOLUTE REALITY: 𝑅[𝑝] (‘in reality, it is the case that p’; ‘it is 
constitutive of reality that p’) 
RELATIVE REALITY:  𝑅𝑡[𝑝] (‘in reality at t, it is the case that p’; ‘it 
is constitutive of reality at t, that p’) 
 
While Neutrality can be expressed also in this case as the idea that the 
sometimes-operator is factive (as in the case of the argument from 
constitution), matters are slightly more complicated when it comes to the 
notion of coherence. In fact, an initial idea may be that the relevant 
notions of coherence ought to be expressed in terms of an Agglomeration 
rule for the reality operator stating that, if it is really the case 
(absolutely/relative to a time t) that p and it is also really the case 
                                                     
10 See also Fine (2001, 2009). 
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(absolutely/relative to t) that q, then it is really the case (absolutely/relative 
to t) that p and q: 
 
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE(R)?: 𝑅[𝑝], 𝑅[𝑞]  ⊢ 𝑅[𝑝 ∧ 𝑞]    
RELATIVIST COHERENCE(R)?: 𝑅𝑡[𝑝], 𝑅𝑡[𝑞]  ⊢ 𝑅𝑡[𝑝 ∧ 𝑞]    
 
However, as Fine himself stresses, there are reasons to be dissatisfied 
with this idea. In particular, one reason to reject Agglomeration for 𝑅 is 
that ‘one might want to explain the obtaining of a conjunctive fact in terms 
of the obtaining of its conjuncts’, so that ‘conjunctive facts will disappear 
from reality on this view in favour of their conjuncts’ (Fine, 2005: 281).  
However, there appears to be a quick fix to this problem. It is sufficient 
to take the reality operator to be capable of having pluralities of sentences 
in its scope instead of only a single one.11 This allows us to draw a 
distinction between the metaphysical reality of a conjunction—expressed as 
‘𝑅[𝑝 ∧ 𝑞]’—and the metaphysical reality of the plurality of its conjuncts 
taken together—expressed as ‘𝑅[𝑝, 𝑞]’—and thus to properly formulate 
Coherence for metaphysical reality as follows: 
 
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE(R): 𝑅[𝑝], 𝑅[𝑞]  ⊢ 𝑅[𝑝, 𝑞] 
RELATIVIST COHERENCE(R): 𝑅𝑡[𝑝], 𝑅𝑡[𝑞]  ⊢ 𝑅𝑡[𝑝, 𝑞]    
 
In this way, to say that reality is fragmented (for, say, absolutists) is to 
say that (for some p and q) although p and q are both really the case, they 
are not really the case ‘together’, so that although 𝑅[𝑝] and 𝑅[𝑞] are true, 
𝑅[𝑝, 𝑞] isn’t. 
The idea that reality is sufficiently variegated can thus be expressed as 
the idea that some instance of the following schemas is true:  
 
ABSOLUTIST VARIEGATION(R): 𝑺𝑅[𝑝] ∧ 𝑺𝑅[𝑞] ∧ 𝑨~𝑅[𝑝, 𝑞]     
RELATIVIST VARIEGATION(R): 𝑺𝑅𝑡[𝑝] ∧ 𝑺𝑅𝑢[𝑞] ∧ 𝑨~∃𝑣𝑅𝑣[𝑝, 𝑞] 
                                                     
11 This option is also suggested by Lipman (2015: 3124, footnote 2). 
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The argument against naïve realism can thus be given as follows: 
 
The argument from reality 
 
(B1) 𝑺𝑅[𝑃] ∧ 𝑺𝑅[𝑄] ∧ 𝑨~𝑅[𝑃, 𝑄]    Ass. (Absolutist Variegation(R)) 
(B2) 𝑺𝑅[𝑃]                                        B1 by ∧-E 
(B3) 𝑺𝑅[𝑄]                                        B1 by ∧-E 
(B4) 𝑨~𝑅[𝑃, 𝑄]                                  B1 by ∧-E 
(B5) 𝑅[𝑃]                                           B2 by Neutrality  
(B6) 𝑅[𝑄]                                           B3 by Neutrality 
(B9) ~𝑅[𝑃, 𝑄]                                    B4 by 𝑨-factivity 
(B10) 𝑅[𝑃, 𝑄]                                     B5,B6 by Coherence(R) 
(B11) Contradiction!                              B7,B8 by ∧-I 
 
 
 
VI. Factivity, fragmentalism and adjunction 
 
VI.1 Fragmentalism and sub-valuationism 
 
Some authors have claimed that, under the assumption of 
fragmentalism, Fine’s reality operator cannot be factive.12 The argument 
bolstering this claim seems to be something along the following lines. 
Given fragmentalism, the idea that reality is sufficiently variegated ought 
to entail that, for some p and q, it is both really the case that p and really 
the case that q, and yet it is not the case that p and q (being p and q 
incompatible): 
                                                     
12 See Merlo (2013) and Lipman (2015).  
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(*) 𝑅[𝑝] ∧ 𝑅[𝑞] ∧ ~(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) 
 
However, if the reality operator is factive, from the first and second 
conjunct of (*) we can infer ‘p’ and ‘q’ respectively, and then, by adjunction, 
we can derive their conjunction ‘𝑝 ∧ 𝑞’, contradicting thus the third 
disjunct of (*). Furthermore, the idea that the reality-operator shouldn’t 
be taken to be factive in the context of fragmentalism seems to be 
suggested by Fine himself in passages like the following one: 
 
We might naturally take a fact to belong to reality if it belongs to a 
reality. It is then the […] assumption […] that any fact belonging 
to reality obtains, which should be given up [by non-standard 
realists]; for the fact may relate to one reality and the obtaining to 
another. In stating that a fact belongs to reality, we adopt a general 
perspective but, in stating that a fact obtains, we adopt the current 
perspective; and it is because of this shift in perspective that we 
cannot generally assert that the facts belonging to reality will obtain. Thus, 
once again, it is the absence of a single coherent reality that allows 
us to reject one of the assumptions upon which the argument 
depends. (Fine 2005: 297-98; my italics) 
 
As Lipman (2015, 2016a) has noted, however, the idea of a non-factive 
notion of reality seems to be misguided, to say the least. How could a fact 
be real without being a fact? How could it be really the case that p, if the 
negation of p is the case?13 At the same time, however, it appears difficult 
to deny that the idea that reality is temporally variegated ought to entail 
something like (*) in the context of fragmentalism. For this reason, I take 
fragmentalism to be better understood as a theory committed to the 
rejection of the classical rule of Adjunction:  
 
ADJUNCTION: 𝑝, 𝑞 ⊢ 𝑝 ∧ 𝑞 
 
                                                     
13 See Lipman (2016: 6). 
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Notice that the version of fragmentalism I am introducing here differs 
from the version of fragmentalism presented by Lipman (2015, 2016b, 
forthcoming). In order to make sense both of fragmentalism and the 
notion of ‘co-obtainment’ of facts, Lipman offers the following theory. A 
model 𝑀 is a pair < 𝑊, 𝑣 >, where 𝑊 is a set of points and 𝑣 is a function 
that assigns either 1 or 0 to each of the atomic sentences relative to the 
points in 𝑊. The members of 𝑊 are thought of as representing fragments 
and the function 𝑣 is extended to an assignment to all sentences via the 
following recursive clauses (where ‘⊙’ stands for the co-obtainment 
operator, so that ‘𝐴 ⊙ 𝐵’ should be read ‘𝐴 insofar as 𝐵’): 
 
(L1) 𝑣𝑤(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) = 1    iff    𝑣𝑡(𝐴) = 1 and 𝑣𝑡(𝐵) = 1 
(L2) 𝑣𝑤(~𝐴) = 1    iff    𝑣𝑡(𝐴) ≠ 1  
(L3) 𝑣𝑤(𝐴 ⊙ 𝐵) = 1    iff    𝑣𝑡(𝐴) = 1 and 𝑣𝑡(𝐵) = 1 
 
(note that the clauses for conjunction and negation are classical, and 
that the clauses for co-obtainment and for conjunction are identical). The 
notion of truth in a model is then defined as follows: 
 
(L4) 𝑀 ⊩ 𝑝   iff    ∃𝑤(𝑣𝑤(𝑝) = 1)      for any atomic 𝑝 
(L5) 𝑀 ⊩ 𝐴 ⊙ 𝐵   iff    ∃𝑤(𝑣𝑤(𝐴 ⊙ 𝐵) = 1)  
(L6) 𝑀 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵   iff    𝑀 ⊩ 𝐴  and   𝑀 ⊩ 𝐵  
(L7) 𝑀 ⊩ ~𝐴   iff    𝑀 ⊮ 𝐴  
 
Finally, the notion of logical truth and logical consequence can be 
defined as follows: 
 
(LT) A sentence 𝐴 is logically true if, and only, if for every model 
𝑀, 𝑀 ⊩ 𝐴   
(LC) A sentence 𝐴 is a logically consequence of a set of sentences 
Σ if, and only, if for every model 𝑀, if 𝑀 ⊩ Σ, then  𝑀 ⊩
𝐴   (where by 𝑀 ⊩ Σ we mean that 𝑀 ⊩ 𝐵, for every 𝐵 in 
Σ) 
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The kind of fragmentalism I am proposing here can adopt Lipman’s 
models. However, it doesn’t need to define a novel operator for the notion 
of co-obtainment, but can simply extend the function 𝑣 in a classical way: 
 
(R1) 𝑣𝑡(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) = 1    iff    𝑣𝑡(𝐴) = 1 and 𝑣𝑡(𝐵) = 1 
(R2) 𝑣𝑡(~𝐴) = 1    iff    𝑣𝑡(𝐴) ≠ 1  
 
Then, it can simply define the notions of truth in a model as follows:  
 
(R3) 𝑀 ⊩ 𝐴   iff    ∃𝑡(𝑣𝑡(𝐴) = 1)  
 
and endorse the definition of logical truth and logical consequence 
given in (LT) and (LC).  
This kind of fragmentalism is thus a straightforward form of sub-
valuationism, as it takes a sentence to be true if, and only if, there is some 
fragment ‘at which’ it is true. 14 Therefore, it admits the possibility of 
dialetheias,15 as the fact that ‘𝐴’ is true at some fragment, and thus simpliciter, 
is perfectly compatible with ‘~𝐴’ being true at some other fragment, and 
so simpliciter.16 Notice, however, that even when that is indeed the case, it 
doesn’t follow that there is a fragment at which ‘𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴’ is true. In fact, 
since valuations are classical, (the following version of) the Law of Non-
Contradiction is valid within this theory:  
 
(LNC) ⊨ ~(𝐴 ∧ ~𝐴) 
                                                     
14 On subvaluationism see, among others, Varzi (1997) and Cobreros (2013). 
15 At least if a dialetheia is taken to be ‘a sentence, A, such that both it and its 
negation, ¬A, are true’ (Berto and Priest 2013). 
16 Cameron (2015) claims that fragmentalism, which is a metaphysical thesis, 
shouldn’t be confused with dialetheism, which is instead a semantic thesis. I agree. 
What I am claiming here isn’t in fact that fragmentalism and dialetheism are the 
same, but that (for reasons that have to do with the factivity of Fine’s reality 
operator) fragmentalism should be best considered as committed to embracing 
some form of dialetheism.  
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Reasons of space require me to leave a thorough comparison between 
this theory (‘R-fragmentalism’) and Lipman’s fragmentalism (‘L-
fragmentalism’) for another occasion. However, there is one important 
difference that may be worth mentioning. Consider, in fact, the following 
claims that could be made about a certain time t: 
 
(T1) 𝑡 is present 
(T2) 𝑡 is past 
(T3) 𝑡 isn’t present (i.e.: it is not the case that 𝑡 is present) 
(T4) 𝑡 is past and 𝑡 isn’t present  
(T5) 𝑡 is present and 𝑡 is past 
 
Quite intuitively, if our models are meant to adequately capture the 
reality of temporal passage (which should plausibly be a central task of any 
realist theory of tense), then the fragments they contain should be subject 
to certain constraints when it comes to A-facts like (T1)-(T5). For 
instance, at no fragment in any model both (T1) and (T2) should be true. 
In the same vein, no fragment in any model should make (T5) true.17 
Suppose, then, that both L-fragmentalists and R-fragmentalists construct 
their models accordingly. Interestingly, supposing that 𝑡 is indeed a time 
that becomes present and then past (so that there is a fragment of reality 
containing the fact that 𝑡 is present and a fragment containing the fact that 
𝑡 is past), R-fragmentalism predicts (T1)-(T4) to be all true and (T5) to be 
false, as one would seem to expect under the assumption of fragmentalism. 
Instead, L-fragmentalism appears to behave somewhat strangely in this 
case. ‘𝑡 isn’t present’ turns out to be actually false, and so does (T4). 
However, it is true to assert (T5) and thus to say—in one single breadth!—
that 𝑡 is both present and past.  
To be fair, many of the relevant desiderata can find a suitable L-
fragmentalist-friendly reformulation by means of the co-obtainment 
operator. For instance, even if they cannot deny (T5) L-fragmentalists can 
say that  
                                                     
17 The idea that (T5) should be rejected by A-theorists has been recently 
challenged by Tallant (2015). 
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(T6) It is not the case that 𝑡 is present insofar as 𝑡 is past 
(‘¬(𝑃𝑟(𝑡) ⊙ 𝑃𝑎(𝑡))’) 
 
which is a way to say that 𝑡 is present and 𝑡 is past don’t co-obtain. 
Similarly, even if they cannot assert (T4) is true, L-fragmentalists can say 
that  
 
(T7) 𝑡 is past insofar as 𝑡 isn’t present (‘𝑃𝑎(𝑡) ⊙ ¬𝑃𝑟(𝑡)’) 
 
However, R-fragmentalism can easily meet the relevant desiderata 
without invoking any novel primitive notion of co-obtainment. 
Furthermore, instead of taking incompatibility to be impossible co-
obtainment (as L-fragmentalism does): 
 
L-INCOMPATIBILITY: ‘the fact that A and the fact that B are 
incompatible iffdf necessarily   ~(𝐴 ⊙ 𝐵)’ (Lipman 2015: 
3131) 
 
R-fragmentalism can simply take it to amount to the impossibility of a 
corresponding conjunction, as it appears to be more intuitive and plausible 
 
R-INCOMPATIBILITY: The fact that A and the fact that B are 
incompatible iffdf necessarily   ~(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵)18  
                                                     
18 Lipman also distinguishes between contrary and incompatible facts, where contrary 
facts are facts that are R-incompatible, in our sense. Notice that the distinction 
can survive in the context of R-fragmentalism. By introducing a truth-operator in 
the object language to capture the R-fragmentalist notion of sub-truth  
(R4) 𝑣𝑡(T𝐴) = 1    iff    ∃𝑧(𝑣𝑧(𝐴) = 1)  
the notion of contrary facts can be defines as follows 
 R-CONTRARINESS: the fact that A and the fact that B are contrary facts iff 
necessarily ~(𝑇𝐴 ∧ 𝑇𝐵)  
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Surely the fact that R-fragmentalism can accept the truth of both a 
sentence and its negation may be met with some scepticism. However, the 
ability of R-fragmentalism to draw a wedge between the truth of two 
incompatible sentences and the truth of their conjunction seems to 
capture in a clear and intuitive sense Fine’s fragmentalist claim that reality 
is ‘incoherent’ (in the sense of containing incompatible facts) and yet 
‘consistent’ (in the sense of not admitting of true contradictions). At least 
prima facie, there seem thus to be some reasons to prefer R-fragmentalism 
over its L-counterpart.19 
  
                                                     
An example of contrary facts can be given by pairs of sentences of the form 
<‘𝑇𝐴’,‘~𝑇𝐴’>. Notice, that this in turn entails that also the following versions of 
the Law of Non-Contradiction are valid for R-fragmentalism (where ‘F𝑝’ is 
defined as ‘~T𝑝’) : 
(LNC2) ⊨ ~(T𝐴 ∧ ~T𝐴) 
(LNC3) ⊨ ~(T𝐴 ∧ F𝐴) 
19 The idea of R-fragmentalism is perhaps the point of greatest distance from 
Fine’s own construal of fragmentalism. Fine clearly states that ‘it will not be 
correct for me simultaneously to assert both that I am sitting and that I am 
standing. For any such assertion will only relate to those aspects of reality that 
‘cohere’ with the existence of the given assertion; and so, it will only be correct 
for me to assert that I am sitting if, at the time of the assertion, I am sitting’ (2005: 
282). Instead, there seems to be nothing debarring R-fragmentalists from 
simultaneously asserting both ‘I am sitting’ and ‘I am sitting’ (as long as they don’t 
assert their conjunction). Since, however, these assertions do strike one as odd, 
R-fragmentalists appear to have the burden to account for their oddness. 
Although reasons of space force me to leave also this issue for another occasion, 
the challenge doesn’t seem to be difficult to meet. For instance, R-fragmentalists 
could invoke the idea that, when ordinarily speaking, we (somehow) operate an 
implicit and tacit restriction of the relevant circumstances of evaluation to the single 
fragment in which our assertion is made. This would explain why only assertions 
correctly describing what is the case at that ‘fragment of assertion’ count as true 
in ordinary circumstances. 
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VI.2 The argument from truth 
 
R-fragmentalism appears to be interesting for two further reasons, 
beyond the fact that it allows one to take the reality operator to be factive. 
The first concerns the notion of truth, while the second concerns the 
notion of truthmaking. Let us review them in turn. 
The rejection of Adjunction is naturally accompanied by the rejection 
of Agglomeration for the truth-operator ‘it is true that’ (‘𝑇’):  
 
AGGLOMERATION:  𝑇(𝑝), 𝑇(𝑞) ⊢ 𝑇(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞) 
 
Interestingly enough, once the option of rejecting Agglomeration is on 
the table, it seems possible to construct a Finean argument based on the 
notion of truth that is parallel to the argument from constitution and the 
argument from reality.20  
As in the case of the argument from constitution, let’s assume that our 
tense realists have a basic notion of truth. Such notion may be either 
absolute or relative, tensed or tenseless, coherent or incoherent. However, 
it is possible to prove that realists cannot take it to be absolute, tenseless 
and coherent, if they also uphold that reality is sufficiently variegated over 
time (in the relevant sense).  
The absolutism/relativism distinction concerning (the basic notion of) 
truth can be simply cashed out in terms of an absolute and a time-indexed 
truth operator: 
 
ABSOLUTIST TRUTH: 𝑇𝑝 (‘it is true that p’) 
RELATIVIST OPERATOR:  𝑇𝑡𝑝 (‘it is true at t that p’) 
 
Once again, Neutrality can be expressed as the idea that the sometimes-
operator is factive. Instead, the notion of coherence can be expressed in 
                                                     
20 Notice that the argument from truth that I am about to present must not be 
confused with the ‘Argument from Truth’ that is presented by Fine (2005: 287-
94; see also the previous footnote on this).  
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this case by means of the following rules of Agglomeration for the truth-
operator: 
 
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE(T): 𝑇𝑝, 𝑇𝑞 ⊢ 𝑇(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)    
RELATIVIST COHERENCE(T): 𝑇𝑡𝑝, 𝑇𝑡𝑞 ⊢ 𝑇𝑡(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)    
 
The absolutist and relativist idea of temporal variegation can be 
expressed as the idea that the following schemas have true instances: 
 
ABSOLUTIST VARIEGATION(T): 𝑺𝑇(𝑝) ∧ 𝑺𝑇(𝑞) ∧ 𝑨~𝑇(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)     
RELATIVIST VARIEGATION(T): 𝑺𝑇𝑢(𝑝) ∧ 𝑺𝑇𝑣(𝑞) ∧ 𝑨~∃𝑤𝑇𝑤(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)     
 
The argument from truth can be thus be given as follows: 
 
The argument from truth 
(C1) 𝑺𝑇(𝑃) ∧ 𝑺𝑇(𝑄) ∧ 𝑨~𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄)          Ass. (Absolutist Variegation(T)) 
(C2) 𝑺𝑇(𝑃)                                            C1 by ∧-E 
(C3) 𝑺𝑇(𝑄)                                            C1 by ∧-E 
(C4) 𝑨~𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄)                                   C1 by ∧-E 
(C5) 𝑇(𝑃)                                               C2 by Neutrality  
(C6) 𝑇(𝑄)                                               C3 by Neutrality 
(C7) ~𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄)                                      C4 by 𝑨-factivity 
(C8) 𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄)                                        C5,C6 by Coherence(T) 
(C9) Contradiction!                                     C7,C8 by ∧-I 
 
As it should be apparent, many familiar arguments in the literature 
concerning time and change either display a structure that is similar to the 
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structure of the argument from truth or can at least be re-formulated 
according to its structure. This, I submit, is a welcome result.21  
 
VI.3 Truthmakers 
 
The notion of truth-coherence was defined as a rule of Adjunction for 
the truth-operator, while the notion of constitution-coherence was 
defined by means of the notion of binary mereological sum: 
 
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE(T):  𝑇𝑝, 𝑇𝑞 ⊢ 𝑇(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)    
ABSOLUTIST COHERENCE:  𝐶(𝑎), 𝐶(𝑏) ⊢ 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑏)     
 
Interestingly enough, the two principles can be shown to entail each 
other, if the following principles are assumed (‘𝑎 ⊩ 𝑃’ stands for ‘𝑎 makes 
𝑃 true’): 
 
TM1:  𝑇(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) if, and only if, for some facts 𝑥 and 𝑦: 𝐶(𝑥), 
𝐶(𝑦), 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑦), 𝑥 ⊩ 𝐴 and 𝑦 ⊩ 𝐵 
TM2:  If 𝑇(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), then for every fact 𝑥 and 𝑦 such that 𝐶(𝑥), 
𝐶(𝑦), 𝑥 ⊩ 𝐴 and 𝑦 ⊩ 𝐵, we have that 𝐶(𝑥 + 𝑦) 
TM3:  𝑇(𝑝) if, and only if, there is some fact x such that: 𝐶(𝑥) and  
𝑥 ⊩ 𝑝 
TM4:  For every x, if 𝐶(𝑥), then there is some 𝑝, such that 𝑥 ⊩ 𝑝 
 
According to TM1, if a conjunction is true than there is a pair of facts 
constituting reality that make the conjuncts true (respectively), and are 
such that also their fusion constitutes reality. According to TM2, if a 
                                                     
21 Just a way of example, consider for instance the following reconstruction of the 
argument from temporary intrinsics (Lewis 1986): Let  F and G be two incompatible 
intrinsic properties so that it is never true that something is both F and G. Assume 
that it is sometimes true that a is F, and that it is sometimes true that a is G. By 
Neutrality, it is both true that a is F and that a is G. By Coherence(T), it is true 
that a is both F and G. Contradiction! 
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conjunction is true, then every pair of facts constituting reality and making 
its conjuncts true is such that their fusion constitutes reality. According to 
TM3, every truth has a fact constituting reality as a truthmaker (and, 
clearly, every truthmaker entails the truth of what it makes true). Finally, 
according to TM4, every fact constituting reality is a truthmaker (for some 
p).22  
Beyond the truthmaker maximalist idea expressed by TM3, TM1-4 can 
be seen as articulating two main ideas: (i) the idea that all facts constituting 
reality are truthmakers for some truth, and (ii) the idea that conjunctions 
are made true by the binary sum of their conjuncts. The first idea seems 
to be highly plausible on its own, it’s already present in what Fine (2005) 
says about the notion of ‘verification’ (Fine 2005: 289-98), and is explicitly 
endorsed in the debate by authors like Correia and Rosenkranz (2011).23 
The second idea, on the other hand, while at least not counter-intuitive on 
its own, features in the recent work of Fine (2014, manuscript) himself on 
‘truthmaker semantics’.24 It appears thus that, at least in this context, TM1-
                                                     
22 From Coherence(T) to Coherence: Assume Coherence(T) and suppose that 𝑓 and 𝑔 
are facts constituting reality. By TM4 both 𝑓 and 𝑔 make true some propositions 
𝑃 and 𝑄. By TM3 we have 𝑇(𝑃) and 𝑇(𝑄) and, by Coherence(T) we have that 
𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄). TM2 then entails that the binary fusion of 𝑓 and 𝑔 constitutes reality. 
QED 
From Coherence to Coherence(T): Assume Coherence and both 𝑇(𝑃) and 𝑇(𝑄). By 
TM3, 𝑃 and 𝑄 have some truthmakers 𝑓 and 𝑔 such that they both constitute 
reality. By Coherence we have 𝐶(𝑓 + 𝑔), and by TM1 we have 𝑇(𝑃 ∧ 𝑄). QED 
23 ‘It is of the essence of facts that they sometime serve as truth-makers’ (Correia 
and Rosenkranz 2011: 45). 
24 Fine’s truthmaker semantics comes with a collection of states endowed with 
mereological structure (a ‘state space’). The notion of a state exactly verifying (and 
falsifying) a statement is recursively defined. Exact verification for conjunctions 
is defined as follows (using here ‘⊩’ for exact verification): 
TS-CONJUNCTION: 𝑠 ⊩ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  if, and only if, for some states 𝑢 and 𝑣: 
𝑠 = (𝑢 + 𝑣) and 𝑢 ⊩ 𝐴 and 𝑡 ⊩ 𝐵 (see Fine manuscript: section 5) 
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4 have the ring of plausibility to them. Therefore, insofar as the argument 
from truth can be seen as a plausible version of Fine’s McTaggart, it seems 
that principles TM1-4 can be taken as bolstering the choice, made in 
section 3, to formulate the notion of constitution-coherence in terms of 
binary sums and to take fragmentalism as the theory according to which 
there are pairs of facts that constitute reality even if their mereological 
fusion doesn’t.  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Kit Fine’s McTaggartian arguments and his novel map of tense-realism 
appear to be one of the most interesting contributions to the debate on 
time and tense in recent years. In this paper I have tried to provide an 
interpretation of Fine’s arguments (and the resulting map of tense-realist 
positions) attempting, on the one hand, to make the logical structure of 
the arguments as clear and explicit as possible, and on the other hand, to 
shed some new light on some of the aspects of Fine’s picture that have 
proven to be of more difficult interpretation in the literature.  
I have presented three arguments based on the three notions of 
constitution, metaphysical reality, and truth. Each argument features a 
                                                     
According to TS-Conjunction, a state verifies a conjunction if, and only if it is the 
binary fusion of two states verifying the conjuncts. Fine assumes that states can 
be impossible, possible, or actual, in which case they are called facts. Consequently, 
a statement can be taken to be true in this framework if, and only if, it is verified 
by a fact: 
TS-TRUTH: 𝑇(𝐴) if, and only if, for some fact 𝑠, 𝑠 ⊩ 𝐴 (see Fine 2014: 
560). 
If the notion of truthmaking employed in this section is interpreted as exact 
verification and the notion of fact in Fine’s truthmaker semantics is interpreted 
as ‘fact constituting reality’, in Fine’s (2005) sense, then, while both TM2 and TM4 
seem to be at least compatible with Fine’s conception of states and their 
mereology, it is easy to see that TS-Conjunction and TS-Truth entail TM1 and 
TM3, respectively. 
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certain notion 𝜙 which applies (either as a predicate or as an operator) to 
a certain kind of items (facts or propositions). In every case, the distinction 
between Relativism and Absolutism corresponds to the question about 
whether 𝜙 is indexed to a time or not: 
 
ABSOLUTE-𝜙:  𝜙{𝜉} 
RELATIVE-𝜙:  𝜙𝑡{𝜉} 
 
In each of the arguments the thesis whose rejection characterizes 
Fine’s presentism—Neutrality—is expressed by an that the familiar 
temporal operator ‘it is sometimes the case that’ (‘𝑺’) is factive: 
 
NEUTRALITY: 𝑺𝑝 ⊢ 𝑝   
 
The only difference between the arguments concerns the formulation 
of Coherence which, focussing here on its absolutist version, is expressed 
in terms of mereological fusions for the notion constitution, in terms of 
pluralities for the notions of metaphysical reality, and in terms of conjunctions 
for the notion of truth: 
 
COHERENCE: 𝐶(𝑎), 𝐶(𝑏) ⊢ 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑏) 
COHERENCE(R):  𝑅[𝑝], 𝑅[𝑞]  ⊢ 𝑅[𝑝, 𝑞] 
COHERENCE(T):  𝑇𝑝, 𝑇𝑞 ⊢ 𝑇(𝑝 ∧ 𝑞)    
 
This, however, should be taken as a welcome result. Recall that 
according to Fine, reference to facts and conjunctions can always be 
dispensed in favour of talk about metaphysical reality (regimented by his 
reality operator 𝑅). At the same time, although conjunctions and fusions 
aren’t part of the fundamental furniture of reality, they are quite plausibly 
grounded in it.25 It should thus cause no surprise the fact that the kind of 
‘togetherness’ characterizing the notion of coherence manifests itself as a 
plurality at the fundamental level and either as a conjunction or a 
                                                     
25 See Fine (2012) on the notion of grounding. For an introduction see, among 
many others, Bliss and Trogdon (2014). 
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mereological sum at more derivative levels, depending on the kind of entities 
in question. 
The aim of this paper was to present a reconstruction of Fine’s 
McTaggartian arguments and to give a comprehensive bird’s-eye view of 
its main characterizing features. Reasons of space have forced me to leave 
many important issues for another occasion. Whether what was proposed 
in this paper will be able to withstand closer scrutiny, only time will tell. 26   
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